Montaigne's Impact on the Scientific Method and the Law of the Land
Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592) spent thirteen years as a magistrate in the Parlement of Bordeaux. A Parlement was not a legislature but a high court of law; his daily work was hearing cases and weighing evidence. In 1571 he retired to his estate and began writing the Essays, first published in 1580, expanded ever after.
The title itself is a clue: an essai is a trial, a test, a weighing — the word for testing coins on a balance. He claimed no finished system — only to try his judgment on every subject, starting with the one subject close at hand: himself. That modest method — doubt first, observe honestly, report what you find — became one of the seeds of the scientific method. His years on the bench gave him a second subject: the law itself.
"What Do I Know?" — The Habit of Doubt
The scientific method begins with a refusal to take claims on authority alone: a claim must be tested, and stands only so long as the evidence holds it up. Montaigne was practising that refusal before it had a name.
His motto, in French Que sçay-je? — "What do I know?" — he says in Cotton's translation that he bears it "with the emblem of a balance" (Book II, Chapter 12, "Apology for Raymond Sebond"). The same chapter names the disease to be cured: "Presumption is our natural and original disease."
Presumption — assuming we know what we have never examined — is what the method guards against; Montaigne's remedy was observation. His final essay, "Of Experience," opens with the plain statement: "There is no desire more natural than that of knowledge" (Book III, Chapter 13). His laboratory was close to home: "I study myself more than any other subject; 'tis my metaphysic, my physic" (Book III, Chapter 13). Metaphysics and physics were the grand names for the study of reality and of nature; both, he says, begin with careful watching of one real case: himself.
He revised the Essays all his life, leaving the layers visible. Inquiry, for him, never closes: "there is no end of our inquisitions; our end is in the other world" (Book III, Chapter 13). Later thinkers gave this attitude its technical names: skepticism, the habit of doubting any claim not yet tested, and empiricism, the habit of trusting observation over inherited authority. Montaigne practised both before either word was common coin.
The Line Forward: Descartes, Bacon, Pascal
René Descartes, born four years after Montaigne died, pushed the doubt harder: where Montaigne rested in the question, Descartes used methodical doubt to find the one thing that could not be doubted, and built from there. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy notes that the doubt in the "Apology" foreshadows Descartes' Meditations, and that the Essays' mindset shows plainly in the opening of the Discourse on Method — though Descartes, no disciple, aimed at a certainty Montaigne never claimed.
Francis Bacon borrowed the essay form itself, and in his program for a new science attacked the "idols" — the received notions that block inquiry: Montaigne's campaign against presumption and custom, carried into natural philosophy. Hazlitt, this translation's editor, noted that Bacon and Shakespeare alike drew freely on the Essays.
Blaise Pascal wrestled with Montaigne throughout the Pensées; much of his skepticism is traditionally credited to that reading.
The Magistrate Looks at the Law
Thirteen years of judging taught Montaigne that law does not float above human life; it is made by it — above all, by custom.
Custom, for Montaigne, is the hidden legislator. "The laws of conscience, which we pretend to be derived from nature, proceed from custom" (Book I, Chapter 23, "Of Custom"). What we call natural conscience is mostly our own people's habits, absorbed from childhood. He makes the same point about whole nations in "Of Cannibals": "every one gives the title of barbarism to everything that is not in use in his own country" (Book I, Chapter 31).
Then comes his most quoted sentence on law. In "Of Experience" he asks why laws command obedience, and answers: "Now, the laws keep up their credit, not for being just, but because they are laws; 'tis the mystic foundation of their authority; they have no other, and it well answers their purpose." A law binds, on this view, because it is accepted as law — not because each citizen has weighed it and found it just. Legal positivism, a later doctrine, holds the same separation: a law's authority comes from its being duly made and recognized within a legal system, apart from whether it is morally good. Montaigne was no positivist — he had no system at all — but readers have long treated this passage as one of the earliest blunt statements of that separation.
He was equally blunt about law's multiplication. France, he wrote, had "more laws in France than all the rest of the world put together, and more than would be necessary for the government of all the worlds of Epicurus" (Book III, Chapter 13). His remedy was restraint: "There is little relation betwixt our actions, which are in perpetual mutation, and fixed and immutable laws; the most to be desired are those that are the most rare, the most simple and general; and I am even of opinion that we had better have none at all than to have them in so prodigious a number as we have." No code can match endlessly changing human actions case for case; judgment cannot be replaced by a pile of rules.
Every law also breeds commentary: a gloss is an explanatory note on a text, and in law one generation's glosses become the next generation's authorities. "There is more ado to interpret interpretations than to interpret things, and more books upon books than upon any other subject; we do nothing but comment upon one another" (Book III, Chapter 13).
The Line Forward in Law
Pascal sharpened Montaigne's teaching on custom, asking why what is just on one side of a river is a crime on the other. A century later, Montesquieu's The Spirit of the Laws (1748) made a method of those comparisons, studying nations' laws as products of climate, custom, and history, not copies of one universal pattern. Scholars often trace that comparative habit — look first at how people actually live, then judge their laws — back through Pascal to the Essays. And whenever a modern court follows a statute because it was validly enacted, even while doubting its wisdom, the "mystic foundation" is at work, Montaigne's name or no.
Why He Still Matters
Montaigne founded no school and ran no laboratory; what he left was a discipline of mind — weigh everything, presume nothing, trust what you have tested, and keep testing — which science later gave instruments and institutions. Law is still catching up with his honesty about itself — that its authority rests on acceptance as much as on justice, that custom does quiet legislative work no assembly voted on, and that fewer, simpler, more general laws serve people better than a mountain of rules and commentaries. For anyone whose work runs on evidence and standards, the retired magistrate in his tower is still good company.
Sources
- Michel de Montaigne, Essays, translated by Charles Cotton, edited by William Carew Hazlitt (1877). Project Gutenberg eBook #3600, "Essays of Michel de Montaigne — Complete," gutenberg.org. All quotations above are taken verbatim from this translation. (Note: in the Cotton/Hazlitt edition, "Of Custom" appears as Book I, Chapter XXII and "Of Cannibals" as Book I, Chapter XXX; the citations in this article use the chapter numbering of most modern editions, I.23 and I.31.)
- Marc Foglia, "Michel de Montaigne," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2019 edition), plato.stanford.edu — consulted for the account of Montaigne's legacy on Descartes and the foreshadowing of Cartesian doubt.




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